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Gender and Sexual License:
The Plot Might Change but the
Message Remains the Same
(A Response to William Nelson)
Martha Albertson Fineman*
One way to describe William Nelson's "Criminality and Sexual Moral-
ity in New York"'I is to say that it is a grand historical narrative that
chronicles the doctrinal progression toward the ultimate release of vari-
ous forms of sexuality from their initial repression within the legal sys-
tem. Nelson asserts that while the courts of the 1920s and 1930s
evidenced repressive responses to a variety of "sexual ' 2 issues, they
moved to more libertarian positions in later years. There were some
readjustments eventually necessary in cases where social forces argued
that the freedom had resulted in excesses and extremes, but Nelson's
overall story about legal change expresses a belief in the desirability of
"progress" and progression.
Nelson identifies as a "central insight" of the article his assertion that
"during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, seemingly disparate [legal] develop-
ments ... were linked to each other ... by a judicial commitment to
conferring sexual freedom on individuals, even when that freedom was
carried to excess" (p. 267). This ever-expanding freedom was stopped,
occasionally even reversed, during the 1970s, however, as feminists began
to articulate the harms they identified as caused by male excesses of free-
dom.3 Nelson describes these feminists as "radical" and casts them as
* Isabel Karpin's invaluable assistance on this essay was cheerfully supplied and absolutely
essential.
1. William E. Nelson, Criminality and Sexual Morality in New York, 1920-1980, 5 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 265 (1993). Subsequent citations will be made parenthetically in the text.
2. With the exception of gender-related violence, Nelson at several places characterizes the other
issues he considers in this essay as "sexual." See, for example, Nelson's comments where he finds a
commitment by judges to "conferring sexual freedom" in the context of the decriminalization of
rape, prostitution, and pornography (p. 267). I would dispute the classification of most incidents of
rape and many displays of pornography as "sexual," and have doubts about sexuality as a sufficiently
nuanced general category in which to place prostitution.
3. In the cases of rape and family violence, the retreat from freedom is described as complete
when such conduct is recriminalized. In the case of homosexuality, freedom continues to prevail
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the villains responsible for the hiatus in his historical drama.4
The ultimate moral of the Nelson tale is not a positive one (nor is it
one of progression) in this regard. For the forces of radical feminism-
unleashed in furious backlash to the increase in sexual freedom-have
seemingly destabilized the legal system. In Nelson's view, these women,
by ceasing to demand equality (as exemplified by the "liberal" feminist
goal of sameness of treatment or assimilation to male norms), have
caused a "collapse" in equality "as a coherent concept in regard to gen-
der issues" (p. 340). On the other hand, men whose self-interest is "inev-
itably at war" with the goals of radical women have articulated "diverse
and competing sensibilities and interests [which] produced an ideological
stalemate" (p. 341). The legal system (indeed, the progress of society
itself) has thus been vanquished as "dynamic legal change became
increasingly difficult to achieve, the status quo became reified, and a new
conservatism set in" (p. 341). Thus, one is led to believe that, absent
radical intervention, liberalism (and liberal feminists) would have won
the day and ever-expanding notions of sexual freedom and individual
autonomy would have continued to be expressed by courts.5
As an initial matter, I find it curious that such cataclysmic events as an
"ideological stalemate" and/or the "collapse of equality as a coherent
concept" are attributed to feminism in any of its forms. I am more skep-
tical about the force and extent of the impact that feminism has had on
law (although I do admit to aspirations toward and fantasies about
destabilization in my own work6). Law has always seemed to me to be a
and the conduct remains decriminalized. With prostitution and pornography, however, in spite of
calls for recriminalization and opposing arguments for the continued progression toward freedom,
Nelson tells us that little has happened. Nelson attributes the successes of the movements for
recriminalization to the alignment of feminists with "conservatives." On the other hand, when
feminists opposed the conservative agenda (as with homosexuality) or when there emerged a split
between "liberal" and "radical" feminists (as with prostitution and pornography), freedom
prevailed. Clearly, the cohesive support of the feminists is a crucial component of Nelson's analysis
of legal movement and change. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 267-68.
4. Other contenders for this role would surely include governmental censors and purveyors of
restrictive religious morality, that is, the "conservatives" mentioned in note 3, supra.
5. Moreover, Nelson's narrative does not question the concept or normative constitution of the
term "freedom." It also embodies the unwarranted assumption that sex and sexuality are
unproblematic categories, seemingly unaffected as social experiences by gender or other
differentiating characteristics. For example, Nelson makes no reference to the possible relevance of
gender, race, or class to his historical analysis. It seems clear to me, however, that many
perspectives-not just one-must be brought to bear on the historical changes that Nelson describes
in the regulation of "sexuality." The notion that women and men experience sexuality as well as
other social and cultural events differently, and that such experiences constitute differentiated and
"gendered lives" for the two sexes, is explored in Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing
Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25 (1990); and Martha
Albertson Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference it Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1
(1992).
6. See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274
(1991); Martha Albertson Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy,
23 CONN. L. REV. 955 (1991); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, 46 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 653 (1992); Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law, supra note 5; and Martha Albertson Fineman,
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rather elastic discourse that is well able to absorb and deflect any "radi-
cal" challenges it may encounter. Nelson's essay does not convince me
otherwise.7
Furthermore, I question Nelson's assessment of the destructive incli-
nations of the radical feminists. Attributing to these women ambitions of
repression rather than ambitions of transforming the legal system's
responses to sexuality, he describes them as "intend[ing] to end what
they viewed as their subordination [to men] by establishing their domina-
tion" (p. 340). Nelson tells the reader:
Liberal feminists in the late 1960s, like the leaders of the civil rights
movement, hoped to confer practical freedom and equality on
women by granting women the same rights that men already
enjoyed. In the eyes of more radical feminists, however, such a
strategy would achieve neither practical freedom nor true equality.
... [R]adical feminists articulated a competing self-interest on the
part of women in reducing or eliminating male freedom. Further-
more, they demanded that women's interests in controlling male
sexuality be given preference when they conflicted with men's inter-
ests in sexual freedom (pp. 267-68; emphasis added).
He later states that
the ultimate goal of radical feminists was to make every man appre-
ciate that every woman is "a complex human being with a self-inter-
est not identical with his" and to compel men to give women's
interests priority, even when they conflicted with the interests of
men. 
8
In fact, Nelson several times in the text moves from an initial position
recognizing some legitimate claim on the part of women to a point of
sheer alarm at the potential that such a recognition may lead to discrimi-
nation against men. Another example of this tendency occurs when Nel-
son quite inexplicably recharacterizes the reasonable statement he makes
in his introduction that "[i]n order to free women from the threat of
physical domination in the form of rape and gender-related assaults...
radical feminists wanted to restrain aggressiveness on the part of men"
(p. 267). In his conclusion, Nelson transforms "restraint" into "domina-
tion": "The only way by which women could, in the radicals' view, pre-
vent men from triumphing over them and dominating them, was for
them to triumph over and dominate men" (p. 340).
7. For a discussion of the way dominant ideology transforms radical discourse in law, see
Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, supra note 6, at 289-93.
8. Nelson, supra note 1, at 321 (emphasis added) (quoting SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE
DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINiST REVOLUTION 184 (1970)). Nelson's use of the word
.even" seems to imply an appropriate limit on women's right to resist at the point at which their
resistance infringes on men's "interests." It is not apparent in his analysis that Nelson considered
the possibility that the granting of rights to people who previously did not have them might be
viewed as imposing some expense on the persons who were previously infringing those rights.
1993]
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As his text evolves, Nelson describes the activism of the radical femi-
nists in increasingly threatening terms. At first, he uses their words to
report how they demanded restraints on male aggressiveness. Then,
using his words, he redescribes these restraints first as deprivations of
men's freedom and finally as resulting in the domination of men. The
progression along this continuum in classifying the motivation and objec-
tives of radical feminists seems inevitable, even ordained-his narrative
writes itself, apparently revealing insights with which few could argue.9
This tendency to conflate his individual interpretation with historical
"fact" is the major difficulty I have with Nelson's essay. His style is that
of the sweeping historical narrative cast in assertedly "neutral" and
"objective" terms. I mean this to be much more than a mere criticism of
style, however, for Nelson's approach masks and obscures the important
realization that, just like all intellectual constructions, this essay is an
exercise in interpretation and is profoundly affected by its author's biases.
By ignoring these biases and proceeding without explicitly positioning
himself, Nelson produces a narrative that is confusing and fails to come
to grips with competing implications of change. The confusion is evident
in his choices of both subject and language.
In Nelson's discussion of rape, for example, it is possible to see the
various levels on which the author's particular predispositions and ten-
dencies of selection, omission, and nuance shape this essay. First, a con-
sideration of the interstices of Nelson's language in this discussion shows
his own failure even explicitly to consider gender, let alone to treat it as
an essential analytic device. Yet, gender to a feminist would be central to
any understanding of sex, sexuality, or claims about "freedom" in regard
to the withering away of legal restraints on male behavior. Nelson's use
of "freedom" outside of the context of gender, then, is particularly troub-
ling.10 For the freedom that Nelson identifies is that which (obviously)
belongs to men-it is freedom "to engage in [rape, prostitution, pornog-
raphy, and gender assaults], or at least not be severely punished if they
overstepped legitimate bounds" (p. 268). Nelson further clarifies his
notion of sexual freedom as encompassing the excesses of violence when
he states that "New York judges evidenced their commitment to sexual
freedom not only by recognizing the legitimacy of 'recreational sex,' but
even more by refusing to punish men who carried their freedom to vio-
lent excess by committing either rapes or serious bodily assaults on
9. It is not insignificant, then, that Nelson offers no citation for the asserted desire of the radical
feminists to dominate men.
10. His reference to domination is also troubling. Again, nowhere in the essay is this assertion
documented. In subsequent parts of the essay Nelson discusses a few feminists whom he designates
as "radical," but these women, in their rejection of the values of a phallocentric society, did not
advocate domination of women over men. They did (and do) argue for the rejection of norms of
individualism and autonomy with their potential for exploitation and domination. Nelson
incorrectly confuses the desire of radical feminists to "change men" and end male domination with
the establishment of female domination. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 340.
[Vol. 5: 343
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women" (p. 267; emphasis added). Describing these kinds of assaults
within the context of sexual freedom (even if taken to excess) co-opts the
term and positions feminist demands for the termination of male abuse
and domination as demands for a relinquishment of male freedom."1
Given the unstated and presumed cultural and moral value of "freedom"
as a constituted right, to have one's freedom taken away (even to benefit
another) is an assumed impermissible harm. In other words, Nelson's
narrative positions the feminist demand that women be "free" of abuse in
inevitable opposition to the articulation of another right-that of male
sexual freedom. This characterization of competing freedoms enables
Nelson to conclude at the end of his article that "the radicals stood
against individualism as they strove to unmask liberalism's goal of sexual
freedom as a mere veil for male sexual aggression" (p. 340).
This tactic of casting radical feminist demands as polar to norms of
individualism and equality in regard to male sexual "freedom" also leads
Nelson to conclude erroneously that radical feminists wanted (and, in the
cases of rape and gendered violence, eventually won) inequality or the
ability to dominate men. This is evident in Nelson's discussion of the
changes in the rules requiring corroboration in rape cases. He begins
sympathetically enough, carefully detailing why the corroboration rules
were untenable and the injustice to which they gave rise. Nonetheless,
the essay does not go on to support reform because such requirements
are archaic vestiges of a misogynist society that consistently reinforced
the idea that women are not the equals of men in veracity or, for that
matter, in any other area. Nelson's characterization of the statutory
changes in the corroboration requirements carried out in the 1970s is
that they "completely flipped over the law's formal values on the subject
of rape."' 2 He further concludes that, "[iln regard to the law of corrobo-
11. There are very few liberals, radicals, or conservatives who would agree that rape and gender-
related violence were issues of sexual freedom even though they might think that pornography and
prostitution were. Nelson thus collapses, for the convenience of his historical narrative, crucial
distinctions between different kinds of sexual and violent behavior. In so doing, he flattens out the
complexities of the many-sided arguments concerning how such acts should be characterized. I
wonder whether, in fact, Nelson has accepted the radical feminist position that prostitution and
pornography do line up along a continuum with sexual abuse and gender-related violence except
that, whereas radical feminists would call it a line of sexual subordination, he would call it a line of
sexual freedom. Thus, if radical feminists sought to end sexual freedom in these terms, it is a serious
question whether they can be characterized as manifesting a desire leading toward domination and
deprivation. Moreover, as most liberals would not accept the continuum in either form, but rather
would attempt to demarcate a difference between sexual offenses that were abusive and those that
were expressive, I am not sure where Nelson imagines he is heading with this critique framed as it is
in terms of liberalism's goal.
12. Nelson, supra note 1, at 327. Nelson continues: "A system that had been gradually
emerging for a quarter century, with the object of preventing the entrapment of pleasure-seeking
men, though often at devastating cost to the women and children who provided the pleasure, was
suddenly and surprisingly transformed into a system calculated to prevent victimization, though at
the risk of subjecting innocent men to 'the mercy' of 'designing' women." Id. (quoting People v.
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ration, traditional moral values and newer feminist ones triumphed com-
pletely" (p. 327).
Nelson's concern is with the changes in the law that made it theoreti-
cally possible for a man to be convicted solely on the testimony of a
woman. Of course, prior to this reform a man's denial of rape alone was
sufficient to cancel out a woman's complaint. To pursue a rape prosecu-
tion a woman needed corroboration; something more than just her own
testimony was essential to overcome male denial. What the reform in
fact accomplished was equality between male and female testimony in a
case of rape: corroboration was not required for either. Far from seeing
this as attaining equality, Nelson describes this change as giving rise to
women's "theoretical legal superiority."' 13
As a final point, I find Nelson's almost total focus on law and legal
discourse strangely disingenuous in an article that purports to take into
serious account the impact of "socio-political forces" on the process of
legal change. '4 While it is true that there is some reference in Section III
to the lessons of sexual freedom learned during World War II, they are
all of a liberationist mode. Freedom gained gives rise to the demands for
more: "People who had lived through those years-and this is the
important parallel between homosexual and heterosexual liberation dur-
ing World War II-simply could not go back to their old lifestyles
encrusted by the old traditions" (pp. 314-15). Larger cultural forces
remain mostly ignored, however. I suspect that if a focus on society and
culture had been more apparent some of the oversights in analysis I have
13. Nelson, supra note 1, at 329. Also disturbing is the fact that mere doctrinal change is viewed
as "real" change. Nelson barely acknowledges that far more significant than doctrine is the impact
of prosecutorial discretion and jury nullification on rape prosecutions.
Nelson is surely attempting to disguise his politics in a seemingly neutral project of description
and explication; however, despite himself, he cannot help but reveal his true colors. For instance, on
the same page where he claims that women have ascended to a theoretical position of legal
superiority if not an actual one, he declares that with the acceptance by the courts of the concept of
date rape women gained "the theoretical capacity to send their lovers to jail." Id. (emphasis added).
One has to wonder what he was hoping to convey by using the word "lover" to describe those men
who perpetrate date rape. It is a clumsy abbreviation that underplays and undermines the violence of
the act of date rape.
In another such instance of linguistic self-revelation, Nelson renders the horror of the radical
feminist vision so obvious as to require no explanation. He says: "Indeed, post-1975 cases held that
even a prostitute could complain of rape when her customer failed to pay her fee, and that a man
could be convicted of first-degree sexual abuse when, over his date's protests, he partially disrobed
her and placed his hand on her breasts and other intimate parts while his co-defendant forced her to
touch his penis." Id. at 324-25 (emphasis added). Nelson uses the word "even" as if there is no
dispute that allowing a prostitute to claim rape in such a circumstance is an absurdity. There are
many of us who would simply not agree.
14. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 266. This focus in and of itself is not troubling. In fact, it could
have produced a very interesting article. For example, Nelson in his introduction sets forth various
models of legal change in his analysis of shifts in the legislative and judicial responses to rape,
prostitution, pornography, homosexuality, and gender-related violence. He does not follow through
on this analytic scheme, however; nor does he explore the limitations and strengths of the methods of
movement in relation to the changes sought or accomplished. One slight exception to this is in the
allusion to intra-governmental negotiation carried out through the medium of judicial language. See
id. at 294-95. Unfortunately, this interesting point and many other possible insights into the process
of change are not developed.
6
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol5/iss2/3
Fineman
described above would not have occurred. t5 For example, what would
have been yielded by a serious consideration of the message of the Mitch
Miller song Nelson quotes in the context of trying to define social atti-
tudes toward rape? What are the societal and sexual implications of the
litany claiming that while "Your Lips Tell Me No! No! ... There's Yes!
Yes! in Your Eyes" (p. 310)?
Nelson's predominantly legal and doctrinal perspective allows him to
define narrowly the parameters of his narrative and to wrap things up
very neatly into evolving eras of judicial action and reaction. Looking at
only one set of societal discourses facilitates the detailing of the progres-
sion from the repressive nature of the decades of the 1920s and 1930s to
the freedom of the decades that followed, and sets up as problematic the
feminist reaction against the "progression" that occurred during the
1970s. 6
Yet, even within the legal context, Nelson fails to go beyond the lan-
guage in opinions. He does not tell the reader what has happened in the
post-feminist wake. I suspect, for example, that "freedom" has not been
as derailed as Nelson indicates in regard to rape and domestic violence.
Prosecutors still exercise discretion and juries still fail to convict even
where cases do make it to trial. The idea that (some) men are free to
abuse (some) women has not been eradicated from legal processes and
will not be so long as it remains a viable notion in segments of our society.
Thus, the question asked in Louis Henkin's 1963 article, "Morals and
the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity,"'" is still the right one: What is
the secular, utilitarian, or social purpose of a law? In other words, how
do we as a society legitimately define harm? Even more important, at
least after reading Nelson's history, is this question: Who in this society
gets to define what constitutes harm as distinct from expressions of free-
dom? Given that there are different realities which evoke very different
answers and interpretations, whose perspective counts?
15. In fact, in the end I think that Nelson's whole scheme could be replaced by a simple
assertion: The legal tradition of male domination and exploitation was altered in those instances
where feminists were convincing in their arguments that men's freedom was harmful to women.
When feminists were able at once to make women the center of reform focus and to resist their
relegation to mere objects of male desire, the march toward sexual "freedom" was halted.
16. One thing that is missing from this pared-down account of repression, however, is the
freedom that those same judges blithely afforded to certain members of society to discuss matters of
sexuality with openness and candor and to consume explicit material withheld from more common
folk. The cases of the 1920s and 1930s might represent an era when judges did not openly write
about certain expressions of sexuality in their opinions, but that is not the same as saying that the
larger society eclipsed all discourses about sex and sexuality. In fact, Nelson quotes from a 1938
case distinguishing from general consumption the needs of "the classroom of the law school, the
medical school and clinic, the research laboratory, the doctor's office, and even the theological
school" (p. 277). This narrow focus is particularly surprising since Nelson does refer (on p. 279) to
Foucault's discussion of the "criminalization" of "bucolic pleasures" in The History of Sexuality,
Volume 1: An Introduction.
17. Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscentiy, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391
(1963), cited in Nelson, supra note 1, at 301 n.230.
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